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 
Abstract—Identity deception has become an increasingly 
important issue in the social media environment. The case of 
blocked users initiating new accounts, often called sockpuppetry, 
is widely known and past efforts, which have attempted to detect 
such users, have been primarily based on verbal behavior (e.g., 
using profile data or lexical features in text). Although these 
methods yield a high detection accuracy rate, they are 
computationally inefficient for the social media environment, 
which often involves databases with large volumes of data. To 
date, little attention has been paid to detecting online deception 
using non-verbal behavior.  We present a detection method based 
on non-verbal behavior for identity deception, which can be 
applied to many types of social media. Using Wikipedia as an 
experimental case, we demonstrate that our proposed method 
results in high detection accuracy over previous methods 
proposed while being computationally efficient for the social 
media environment. We also demonstrate the potential of non-
verbal behavior data that exists in social media and how 
designers and developers can leverage such non-verbal 
information in detecting deception to safeguard their online 
communities.  
 
Index Terms— Algorithm, deception, identity, performance, 
social media  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N the past decade we have experienced an increasing level 
of interest in online social media, which enable users to not 
only create content but also exchange it using Web 2.0 
technologies [1]. The number of users registering with social 
networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter keeps 
increasing at a rapid pace amounting to 82 percent of the 
world’s online population [2]. Social network usage has 
increased by 64% since 2005 [3]. The ease with which we can 
generate online profiles at a low cost has also led to ample 
opportunities for identity deception, which at times can have 
fatal consequences. A recent well-known example is the case 
of a mother pretending to be a teenage boy on the social 
networking site MySpace in order to obtain information from 
a teenage girl eventually leading to the girl committing suicide 
[4]. Other social media services such as collaborative projects 
have to engage in “cat-mouse” games by constantly having to 
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block user accounts for individuals joining in with different 
account names not long after a block has been applied. 
Solutions have been proposed that can assist in detecting 
multiple accounts owned by the same individual but their 
effectiveness vary in terms of computational efficiency and 
complexity of practical implementation depending on the 
availability of the appropriate data [5], [6]. Moreover, these 
past methods have mainly focused on detecting deception 
through verbal communication (e.g., speech or text) and have 
ignored the potential of non-verbal (e.g., user activity or 
movement) deception detection, which has shown high 
success rates in the offline world [7], considering that non-
verbal cues are 4.3 times more powerful than verbal cues in 
face-to-face communication [8]. This is a promising detection 
method that we have identified in our previous work and for 
which we presented experimental results in [9]. 
In this paper we propose a novel approach that makes use of 
user non-verbal behavior data in social media in order to 
detect multiple account identity deception. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present an 
overview on deception and identity deception, and discuss 
some of the problems with current identity deception detection 
methods and highlight the research contributions of this paper. 
In Section III, we describe our proposed method. Section IV 
presents the performance results obtained with our proposed 
method. Finally, Section V discusses the implications of our 
proposed technique in the growing field of identity deception 
detection for the social media domain. 
II. RELATED WORKS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK 
A. Deception and Identity Deception 
Deception has been defined as the deliberate transfer of 
false information to a recipient that is not aware that the 
information received has been falsified [6], [10]. In nature it 
can be seen as a mechanism for gaining a strategic advantage 
[11]. Similarly, human deception is motivated by instrumental 
(goal-driven), relational (relationship-driven) and identity-
driven goals [12]. The intent behind these goals may be benign 
(e.g., white lies) or hostile [13]. Online, the success of an 
attempt to deceive others is dependent upon multiple factors 
associated with the components involved: deceiver, social 
medium, potential victim and deceptive action [9]. Factors that 
affect a deceiver’s behavior and effectiveness in achieving 
deception include a deceiver’s expectations, goals, 
motivations, his/her relation to target and a target’s degree of 
suspicion [12]. The last element in particular has been found 
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to indirectly affect human deception detection rates [14]. A 
deceiver’s goal is to use everything at his/her disposal to keep 
a low suspicion from his/her target and this applies to both 
verbal and non-verbal behaviors. There is also a moral cost for 
a deceiver that will affect the likelihood of using deception 
[15]. The software design of the social medium also affects 
deception through factors such as the perceived level of 
security provided by the system along with mechanisms that 
enhance trust and make assurances [16]. The deceptive action 
transmitted through cyberspace also has attributes such as the 
number of targets and the expiry date associated with it that 
influence its success [9]. Finally, a victim’s ability to detect 
deception is an important factor that influences deception 
success. Humans have been consistently shown to be bad 
deception detectors [17]. Another important factor is a 
victim’s Information Communication Technology (ICT) 
literacy [9]. For example, in a study involving Internet fraud 
through page-jacking techniques (developing fake pages of 
legitimate websites) only a handful of individuals detected 
inconsistencies with the fake websites [16]. 
Deception is achieved by manipulating content, the 
communication channel, the sender information, or any 
combinations of these three components [9]. Manipulating 
content involves tampering with images [18] or even text as  
can be seen in collaborative projects such as Wikipedia where 
special user task forces are focused on monitoring for text 
manipulation with the intention to spread inaccurate 
information [5]. Communication channels can be tampered 
with to disrupt communications of a user in an attempt to 
access his/her account or cause confusion between two parties 
(e.g., a case that can be observed online in video gaming 
consoles) [19]. 
Identity deception (a subcategory of deception) focuses on 
manipulating the sender’s information [20] and can be divided 
into three categories: identity concealment (e.g., concealing or 
altering part of an individual’s identity), identity theft (e.g., 
mimicking another person’s real identity) and identity forgery 
(e.g., forging a fictional identity) [6]. Of particular interest for 
social media is identity forgery. Social media services tend to 
allow individuals to easily register new accounts without a 
thorough verification of an identity. In fact, an individual can 
have an unlimited number of accounts appearing as seemingly 
different users to unsuspected individuals. 
B. Deception Detection 
Deception detection theories are divided into those that are 
based on leakage cues (cues sent by the deceiver unwillingly 
due to factors such as cognitive overload) and strategic 
decisions (cues indicative of deception that are willingly 
transmitted by a deceiver in order to ensure deception success) 
[21]. To detect deception, both categories pick up cues from 
verbal and non-verbal communications.  
Human deception detection is arguably the most widely 
used method. Individuals can pick up cues from the 
environment in which an interaction takes place (e.g., a 
photograph that looks edited) with a deceiver and interpret 
these cues by understanding a deceiver’s goals [16]. The most 
critical factor in detecting deception is the time, which can 
vary from days to months, until a truth is uncovered by a 
previously deceived individual [22]. However, people are bad 
at detecting deception with detection success bounded 
between 55 to 60 percent [23] at best while others have 
measured an even lower success of 34 percent [24]. Even 
more troublesome is that a study has found that upon training 
people in detecting verbal and non-verbal cues detection 
accuracy actually decreased [25]. A more standardized 
perspective of examining deception detection is necessary to 
achieve and engineer deception detection solutions with high 
success rates. 
Three of the most popular theories used in the deception 
field are Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), Leakage 
Theory (LT), and Expectancy Violations Theory (EVT) [21], 
[26]. In IDT, deception is seen as a series of exchanges 
between the deceiver and the victim. IDT sees deception as a 
goal-driven event. After each exchange, the deceiver adapts 
his/her behavior depending on the responses that he/she 
receives from his/her potential victim [12]. The adjustments 
made by the deceiver give away verbal and non-verbal 
indications for deception. IDT has been used as the theoretical 
premise for developing a framework for intent detection in 
deception (detecting whether intent is hostile or benign) [13]. 
Similarly, Leakage Theory also involves detecting 
indicators for deception but these are delivered unwillingly by 
the deceiver due to an inability to reproduce the equivalent of 
a truthful behavior in terms of verbal and non-verbal behavior 
[27]. One possible explanation for this behavior is the 
cognitive overload created by a deceiver who attempts to 
control multiple facets of his/her behavior. In addition, a 
deceiver’s awareness may also play a role in the types of cues 
that are leaked. People are naturally adapted to have a good 
control over their facial expression while body language 
(especially that of the lower body) is often seen as less useful 
from a deceiver. Similarly, in social media non-verbal 
behavior such as the time taken to type a text (although this 
can vary in different contexts) is likely to be seen as a 
deception cue by a deceiver much like pauses in speech help 
distinguish deceptive from non-deceptive speech [28]. 
Finally, Expectancy Violations Theory states that a person’s 
normal behavior (e.g., baseline behavior) and the context in 
which this behavior takes place should also be considered 
[26], [29]. Instead of looking for indicators of deception, one 
can focus on comparing an expected interaction (based on 
one’s baseline and context) with a received interaction. Any 
discrepancies between a baseline and an actual behavior can 
signal some probability for deception. For example, a profile 
page from an experienced social networking user is expected 
to vary compared to that of a freshly registered user. EVT has 
been used as the conceptual background for detecting 
deception through digital analysis of head and hand 
movements [26]. 
C. Identity Deception Detection 
A particular issue with identity deception in social media is 
the presence of multiple identities by one user. Both online 
and offline studies have been conducted in an attempt to solve 
the problem of detecting duplicate account records. Wang et 
al. [6]  in their study attempted to identify duplicate records in 
a criminal database using a variety of similarity-based 
detection algorithms. Attributes such as name, address, social 
security number and date of birth from a criminal database 
were compared as strings using a string comparator and the 
level of disagreement for these items was obtained between 
different user records. Furthermore, they obtained the overall 
disagreement between records based on these attributes, and 
those matches that had a disagreement below a certain 
threshold were considered as the same account. The most 
direct solution to identify duplicates in a database with the 
highest accuracy is a cross-comparison for the full length of 
accounts in a database. If one simply compares each account 
to all other accounts in the database this results in high 
computational overheads of O(N
2
). The solution adopted by 
Wang et al. was to use an adaptation of the Sorted 
Neighborhood Method (SNM). The original SNM develops a 
sorting key, sorts a database and then merges the duplicate 
records using a window of fixed size w that moves through the 
sorted records. The adapted SNM version has a shorter 
window w’, where w’ is smaller than w. The window in the 
adapted version is smaller since once a duplicate record is 
found the rest of the comparisons for a window are ignored. 
The method produced high detection accuracy (80.4% for a 
dataset containing missing values for the previously 
mentioned attributes and 98.6% for a dataset without missing 
values) with a computational complexity of O(w’N). The 
adapted SNM version took 6.5 minutes to complete with 1.3 
million records while a record comparison (first approach) 
would have taken 87 days on the same machine. However, the 
time complexity for the adapted SNM does not include the 
sorting of the database. Furthermore, the method is focused on 
identity concealment and probably has limited application for 
cases of identity forgery where verbal information (e.g., 
profile text) in social media can be freely manipulated to an 
extraordinary degree compared to criminal databases. Finally, 
social media include a variety of types varying from blogs to 
social networking sites and even virtual social world that 
differ drastically in terms of what they offer to their users and 
their databases tend to be even larger than criminal databases. 
A more recent study by Solorio et al. attempted to detect 
sockpuppets (these are new accounts of previously blocked 
users) on Wikipedia [5]. They used natural language 
processing techniques to detect users who maintain multiple 
accounts based on their verbal output. Textual features were 
used such as punctuation count, quotation count or the 
variation between using capital or lowercase “I”. These 
features were tested against all revisions made by the users on 
pages throughout Wikipedia. Due to the volume of users on 
Wikipedia in conjunction with the number of revisions that 
each account may have (which can reach thousands), the 
similarity-based method used to identify a positive match 
between two accounts needs to receive manual input (an 
individual needs to set which two accounts need to be 
compared). As such, the method can be considered as a 
human-augmenting deception detection technique since it 
requires individuals to provide input for two potential 
accounts that match. A Support Vector Machine (SVM) model 
has shown 68.83% overall accuracy against an experimental 
dataset of 77 cases of legitimate users and sockpuppets. The 
limitation of this method is its computational cost involved if 
one would like to test all accounts against all accounts in a 
database; a time complexity of O((N*R)
2
) where R is the 
number of revisions made by a user. Testing every new 
account against all accounts currently in the database would 
result in a time complexity of O(N*R). 
The two aforementioned methods described earlier 
demonstrate the limited capabilities of using verbal 
communication to detect identity deception using account 
comparison techniques. These methods yield relatively high 
levels of detection accuracy. However, the cost for such 
accuracy may be too high for detecting duplicate accounts on 
social media. Similarity analyses, when used to evaluate a 
newly registered user with the rest of the database, also incur 
high computational overheads. Moreover, as we mentioned in 
a previous work [9], verbal deception detection as a detection 
methodology completely ignores non-verbal aspects, which 
have shown to be highly effective in exposing deceivers [26], 
[30]. The most common argument based on the literature [11], 
[21] is the fact that in the case of the online environment, a 
deceiver will maximize his/her effort in ensuring that his/her 
verbal behavior does not expose the deception being carried 
out. 
D. Contributions of this work 
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as 
follows: 
 We propose a computationally efficient method 
(applicable to all social media classifications [1]) for 
detecting identity deception through the use of non-
verbal user activity in the social media environment. 
This contribution ensures that a relatively high level 
of overall detection accuracy is obtained that is 
comparable to similar methods that make use of 
verbal communication [5], [6] but with lower 
computational overheads. 
 To demonstrate the computational efficiency (to 
withstand the immense traffic experienced by social 
media services) of our proposed non-verbal method 
to deception detection we use publicly available data 
from Wikipedia and machine learning algorithms. 
 Finally, we present design guidelines for designers 
and developers interested in implementing this 
method as an added level of security for their social 
media communities and additional considerations 
based on various social media classifications in 
existence today. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD FOR DETECTING ONLINE IDENTITY 
DECEPTION 
A. Research Objectives 
Our research goal in this work is to develop a method that 
can automatically detect online identity deception, which can 
be very useful in many online social media scenarios. For 
instance, one scenario where such detection would be useful is 
in the case of an open source software development 
collaborative project website where, for security reasons, 
allows just one account per individual. Since new account 
registration is available to anyone, a user can therefore register 
an unlimited number of times every time his/her account gets 
blocked. Succeeding in identity deception is important for a 
deceiver who wants to inject malicious code into a project. 
Once an account is discovered, all changes made to the code 
by the owner of that account will be investigated and closely 
examined. We argue that an early detection system can help 
identify those individuals who experience a disproportionate 
familiarity with the collaborative software (according to their 
non-verbal behavior), which may indicate that they are not in 
fact newcomers or novices. Post-examination and close 
monitoring of suspect cases will help ensure the security of an 
open source project. 
In this work, we investigate answers to the following 
research questions: Can a user’s non-verbal behavior in social 
media be effectively used in detecting identity deception in 
terms of multiple account ownership and is it more effective 
than previously proposed methods in the literature which used 
verbal similarity searching? 
Can the method be implemented with high computational 
efficiency and low overheads in large social media 
environment where we often have a large number of users? 
To demonstrate our proposed method’s effectiveness we use 
Wikipedia, which falls under the collaborative projects 
classification of social media [1] (shown in Table I), as our 
experimental case. We used publicly available data for 
Wikipedia in order to evaluate our approach. It is worth 
pointing out that  although we have used Wikipedia as an 
example of a social medium, our method can be applied to 
virtually any other social medium environment. We briefly 
describe below some of the non-verbal user activities that can 
be observed on Wikipedia before describing our proposed 
method. 
B. The Wikipedia Environment 
Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia in which everyone 
can contribute without an account (anonymously when only IP 
address is visible) and with an account using a pseudonym or 
even real name. Wikipedia operates on the concept of 
namespaces where each namespace is meant to include a 
specific type of content (or pages). For example, all 
encyclopedic articles belong to the “(Main/Article)” 
namespace (with numeric identifier 0) whereas all article 
discussions (involving discussions on improving articles and 
resolving issues) belongs to its own namespace (“Talk” 
namespace with numeric identifier 1). Wikipedia’s policy 
pages and discussion on Wikipedia proposals or projects 
belong to different namespaces. Wikipedia has 28 
namespaces. 
Users leave a revision footprint on pages when they make a 
change to them. A page revision log is maintained for each 
page where everyone can find who did a specific revision, the 
revision itself and other associated matters relating to the 
revision (when it was made, how many bytes were added or 
removed from a page). A single user interaction with the 
Wikipedia’s environment and two of its namespaces are 
illustrated in Fig. 1. The logged data on page revisions provide 
us with non-verbal user behavior on Wikipedia. For example, 
the time taken between each revision is a measurable non-
verbal behavior. 
C. Non-verbal Behavior Variables 
We used simple and more complex variables to represent 
user behavior. Variables of online non-verbal behavior fall 
under two major categories: time-independent and time-
dependent (henceforth these variables are denoted with index 
t). 
 We started with the number of total revisions (Rt) made by 
a user for a specific time window since their initial registration 
with the website. In addition, we obtained the number of 
revisions as they were distributed in the various namespaces 
such as article (Rat), article discussion (Rdt), user page (Rut), 
user discussion page (Rtt), Wikipedia-related pages and 
Wikipedia-related discussion pages combined under one 
variable (Rwt). A final category was added for all the rest of 
the namespaces such as file uploads, images etc. (Rot). Based 
on these namespaces we also used a variable called the Gini 
coefficient that represents differences in activity distribution 
across these namespaces (bounded between 0 and 1)  and is 
formally defined as [31]: 
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TABLE I 
SOCIAL MEDIA CLASSIFICATIONS 
 Self-presentation / Self-disclosure 
  Low High 
Social 
presence 
/ Media 
richness 
Low Collaborative projects Blogs 
↓ 
Social news sites Microblogging 
Content communities Social networking sites 
High Virtual game worlds Virtual social worlds 
Table derived from previous publications [1], [9]. 
 
Fig. 1.  An example of user activity on Wikipedia along with associated non-
verbal activity. 
  
 where x represents the set of items (revisions on each 
namespace for our case) and w is the relevant weight that may 
be assigned to each item. Equal weights were applied to our 
data because, conceptually, namespaces on Wikipedia do not 
hold any weight and any attempt to assign weights would 
introduce a bias. In addition, we measured the mean number 
of bytes of bytes added or removed by all revisions: 
 
         
    
  
   
  
 (2) 
 
The total number of bytes added (Bat) and total number of 
bytes removed (Brt) from all the revisions during the 
observation window were also calculated. Furthermore, the 
time difference in seconds between the time (TR) a user 
registered their account until the time of the first revision was 
measured along with the namespace (FE) where their first 
revision was made. Finally, the average duration (ADt) 
between revisions was used and is defined as follows: 
 
     
        
  
   
  
 (3) 
 
where n is the total number of revisions and T is the set of 
all Unix times for each revision made. 
D. Data Retrieval and Model Testing 
We collected a list of all publicly available logs of blocked 
users on Wikipedia during the period since February 2004 
until October 2013. The logs include various reasons for 
blocking user accounts including account blocks for verified 
sockpuppet cases (examples of block logs shown in Table II). 
Using regular expressions we kept only sockpuppet cases with 
an infinite time of block issued for these accounts. 
These are users who make a great effort in using deception 
to masquerade as legitimate users while still trying to achieve 
their end goals (e.g., altering a text in a particular article page). 
For example, in the page that holds the discussion
1
 over the 
block of user “Niroshvthanaw” the following is written about 
the account puppeteer: “Masu 7 has created another sock, this 
 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Sockpuppet_investigations/ 
Masu7/Archive 
time changing references to Horana Royal College to Royal 
College, Horana against consensus. Similar behavior has been 
shown by User:Xe2oner, User:Wo2gana, User:Samudrab all 
of whom have been blocked as socks of Masu 7. ” Individuals 
like this user attempt to deceive without getting caught and 
this is revealed by the time taken to block these accounts since 
the initial first revision on Wikipedia. On average it takes 
approximately 75 days for a sockpuppet account to get 
blocked (median is 3.19 days) as evident in our block log 
dataset. Fig. 2 depicts all the sockpuppet cases showing their 
first revision and time when the account was blocked. About 
38.96 percent of sockpuppets have their accounts blocked 
during the first day after their first revision on Wikipedia. Ten 
days after their first revision, the percentage of sockpuppets 
being caught rises to 62.24. By 30 days, the percentage rises to 
74.43. It is quite clear that, while many users are caught early 
on, others evade detection for a considerable amount of time. 
 For testing our proposed method we sampled 7,500 cases 
of sockpuppets. In addition, we retrieved a list of all users who 
made at least one revision through the revision records on all 
Wikipedia namespaces (these are provided as dump xml files 
and were parsed). Verified sockpuppet cases were removed 
from this list and an additional sample of non-blocked users 
was obtained so that our final user list contained 7,500 verified 
sockpuppet cases and 7,500 legitimate user cases. As such, a 
fair coin toss for our sample would produce approximately 
50% accuracy in detecting sockpuppets. Human deception 
detection is usually placed at much lower rates (as low as 30-
50%) [24]. 
For each one of these users in our total sample (sockpuppets 
and legitimate users) we obtained all activity on Wikipedia. 
This activity can be translated into variables which can help us 
test models (e.g., a model can consist of one or more variables 
described previously) for our proposed method. The time 
TABLE II 
EXAMPLES OF USER BLOCKS FOUND IN WIKIPEDIA BLOCK LOGS 
Example of user block due to 
vandalism (e.g., adding false or 
inaccurate information to pages 
with malicious intent) 
Example of user block due to 
sockpuppetry 
id="4933953" 
user="198.202.26.110" 
by="Ronhjones" 
timestamp="2013-12-
30T00:23:57Z" 
expiry="2014-01-13T00:23:57Z" 
reason="[[WP:Vandalism|Vandalis
m]]" 
id="4933944" 
user="Niroshvthanaw" 
by="Anna Frodesiak" 
timestamp="2013-12-
29T23:56:29Z" 
expiry="infinity" 
reason="Abusing [[WP:Sock 
puppetry|multiple accounts]]: See 
[[Wikipedia:Sockpuppet 
investigations/Masu7]]" 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Scatterplot showing the time when a sockpuppet made the first 
revision and the time when the account was blocked. 
  
window set for the user activity will affect all time-dependent 
non-verbal behavior variables and in turn the efficiency of a 
model in terms of its predictive accuracy. It will also force 
some of the cases in our sample to be omitted due to inactivity 
(e.g., a user who made his/her first revision two hours after 
registration would be omitted from the sample if the time 
window is set for an hour after registration). We obtain all 
activity for users in the first 30 days. The users in the sample 
were not banned before these 30 days. Those who have not 
been active for that time window were excluded because 
without the presence of any behavior we cannot build a 
classification. The final sample (for 30 days of user activity) 
consisted of a total of 12,723 users of which roughly 48.23 
percent were sockpuppets. We calculated all variables of non-
verbal behavior for all users in our sample. Just like in the real 
world, these variables are similar to measuring non-verbal 
behavior accompanying verbal interactions such as measuring 
the speed of delivery of a speech of a person and looking for 
deviations from a context specific baseline. 
Time-dependent variables are likely to affect our models 
depending on the time t we would set when testing their 
performance (and subsequently the overall performance of our 
proposed method). We hypothesized that since Wikipedia 
does not encourage the use of multiple accounts, the 
expectation is that a newly registered user will also behave as 
a newcomer. Newcomers are generally unfamiliar with the 
environment (or then tend to exhibit limited familiarity with 
the system). In contrast, a deceiver is not only expected to be 
familiar with the Wikipedia space but to be also very familiar 
with many of the norms and behaviors of legitimate users. 
Since deception can be easily detected through verbal 
communication (e.g., the textual contents of a revision), a 
deceiver is likely to be extra cautious when delivering text. In 
contrast, control over a deceiver’s non-verbal behavior is less 
likely because he/she is not aware that this may be monitored 
and it is less obvious to him/her while interacting with the 
social medium. In addition, long-term behaviors among 
deceivers and real users are expected to vary. To be able to 
identify the best time window we have calculated all non-
verbal, time-dependent variables for each hour during the first 
30 days of activity for all users in the sample. Then the 
standardized difference between sockpuppets and real users 
was calculated for each variable and the trend was represented 
using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (Fig. 3).  For the 
standardized difference we used the correlation coefficient 
produced by point-biserial correlation: 
 
    
     
  
 
    
  
 (4) 
 
where sn is the standard deviation, M1 is the mean of a 
variable (e.g., Rt) for the sockpuppet group A and M0 is the 
mean of the same variable for the legitimate user group, n1 is 
the number of data points for group A, n2 is the number of 
data points for group B, and, n is the total number of data 
points for both groups. 
There are substantial differences for some variables early on 
but behaviors of deceivers seem to deviate more as time 
progresses. This is evident particularly for variables Rt, GRt, 
Rdt and Rtt where changes in the correlation coefficient are 
particularly large. Moreover, in some cases (e.g., GRt) 
deceptive accounts seem to deviate from legitimate accounts 
in a negative trend. In this particular case, we note that 
sockpuppets tend to distribute their efforts in more 
namespaces as time progresses in contrast to legitimate users. 
Others tend to reach a maximum and then stabilize or reach a 
lower value and then become stable. In most cases, it seems 
that, as time progresses a deceiver’s behavior tends to deviate 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Variation of differences in non-verbal user activity variables between 
sockpuppets and legitimate users over a period of a month. Positive scores 
along the y axis indicate increased activity for sockpuppets whereas negative 
scores indicate decreased activity for sockpuppets compared to legitimate 
users. 
  
more than that of a legitimate user. This is similar to real life 
human deception detection where time is an important factor 
for uncovering a lie [22] due to the likelihood of exposing 
such deviations. 
To identify the differences in accuracy as time progresses 
we have calculated several models (Mxt) for t = 1 day (11,207 
cases, baseline for non-sockpuppet cases at 52.86%) and t = 
30 days after registration (12,723 cases, baseline for non-
sockpuppet cases at 51.77%). We developed several binary 
outcome models aimed at using these non-verbal behavior 
variables to detect identity deception. The following models 
were developed: 
             
                  
                                  
    
                                  
                            
                     
                                   
          
                                   
                              
          
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
We used a popular set of machine learning algorithms, 
which includes Support Vector Machine (SVM), Random 
Forest (RF) and Adaptive Boosting (ADA), to implement our 
proposed models. A description of how these algorithms work 
is beyond the scope of this paper but more details can be 
found in books describing them [32], [33]. However, it should 
be noted that all the selected algorithms used are considered 
ideal for models that involve binary outcomes as it was the 
case in our study [32]. 
A. Performance Metrics Used 
To evaluate the efficiency of our models for our proposed 
method we used the following classification matrix shown in 
Table III.  
Using this matrix, we derive results to measure the 
following performance metrics in order to evaluate the 
performance of our models for our proposed method: recall 
(the fraction of valid sockpuppet cases that are returned), 
precision (the fraction of returned cases that are valid 
sockpuppet cases), F-measure (the test of a model’s accuracy 
bounded between 0 and 1 that combines recall and precision), 
accuracy (the fraction of true positives and true negatives 
returned over the total number of cases), false positive rate 
(indicating the rate of falsely identified sockpuppets), and 
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) (a performance 
metric used in machine learning that provides a balanced 
result even if cases in the sample vary substantially in size). 
These performance metrics are formally defined as follows 
[34]: 
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B. Experimental Procedure 
To evaluate the performance efficiency of our models for 
our proposed method we repeated ten times a ten-fold cross-
validation procedure to obtain the mean values for all of our 
performance metrics. Algorithm 1 is used to evaluate our 
models. The algorithm involves splitting the data in ten parts 
and using nine of them to build a model whereas one part is 
used for testing the model.  
procedure TenTimesTenFoldCrossValidation() 
1. // Algorithm builds a single model (e.g., RF) and produces final results 
2. Set a predefined number w 
3. LOOP: n for T=[1,2,…,9,10] 
4.     Set random seed               
5.     Create fold sample list FLi by randomly assigning fold numbers to 
the full length of dataset 
6.     LOOP: f in TT=[1,2,…,9,10] 
7.         Build Random Forest model RF based on training data (FLi not 
equal to f) and S 
8.         Calculate predictions Pi using RF for testing data (FLi equal to f) 
9.         Set Oi as observed values (is or is not a sockpuppet) based on 
testing data 
10.         Build classification matrix using observed Oi and predicted Pi 
values 
11.         Calculate Recall REf, Precision PRf, and F-measure FMf 
12.     END LOOP 
13.     Calculate     
    
 
   
 
  ,     
    
 
   
 
  , and     
    
 
   
 
  
14. END LOOP 
15. Calculate    
    
 
   
   ,    
    
 
   
   , and    
    
 
   
   
End TenTimesTenFoldCrossValidation 
Algorithm 1.  A repeated ten times ten-fold cross-validation algorithm for 
testing a model using random forest. 
 
  
TABLE III 
CLASSIFICATION MATRIX USED TO EVALUATE THE EFFICIENCY OF A 
MODEL-ALGORITHM PAIR 
 
Verified Identity 
Deception 
(Sockpuppetry) 
Verified Legitimate User 
Predicted 
Identity 
Deception 
(Sockpuppetry) 
True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) 
Predicted 
Legitimate User 
False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) 
 
 
The algorithm is sequentially executed until all possible ten 
combinations have been used. This process is repeated ten 
times and each time we used a different seed for splitting the 
dataset. We used this algorithm because it has been previously 
proven to produce highly accurate estimates in terms of how 
models (and as a result our overall method) would perform in 
previously unseen data [32]. 
Test results obtained are presented in Figs. 4a, 4b, 4c for all 
models and algorithms used. These are rounded to three 
decimal digits. 
We summarize the results obtained with our proposed 
detection method compared to two other previously proposed 
approaches and the results are summarized in the Table IV. 
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Based on the results obtained, we found that Adaptive 
Boosting appears to provide the best balance between recall 
and precision whereas maintaining the highest achieved 
accuracy. Recall levels are relatively high (64.8 percent for the 
best case) which means that most cases are picked up by the 
our proposed method. In terms of precision, we found that a 
relatively large amount of false positives is obtained (best case 
RF M430 still results in 25.5 percent of false positives). This is 
not necessarily a bad result if the detection method is not 
implemented so that it automatically blocks suspect cases. If 
 
Fig. 4a. SVM results for all models. 
 
 
Fig. 4b. RF results for all models. 
 
 
Fig. 4c. ADA results for all models. 
 
Fig. 4.  Performance results for all models and algorithms used in this study. 
Y-axis represents results for all of our performance metrics (bounded 
between 0 and 1). 
  
Precision Recall 
F-
measure 
Accuracy FPR MCC 
M1 0.563 0.52 0.54 0.573 0.376 0.144 
M2₁ 0.684 0.452 0.544 0.643 0.187 0.286 
M3₁ 0.672 0.485 0.563 0.645 0.211 0.288 
M4₁ 0.669 0.478 0.557 0.642 0.212 0.281 
M2₃₀ 0.716 0.578 0.64 0.686 0.213 0.374 
M3₃₀ 0.701 0.615 0.655 0.688 0.244 0.375 
M4₃₀ 0.698 0.623 0.658 0.688 0.251 0.375 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
M1 
M2₁ 
M3₁ 
M4₁ 
M2₃₀ 
M3₃₀ 
M4₃₀ 
Precision Recall 
F-
measure 
Accuracy FPR MCC 
M1 0.532 0.516 0.524 0.548 0.423 0.094 
M2₁ 0.683 0.492 0.572 0.653 0.204 0.304 
M3₁ 0.676 0.562 0.614 0.667 0.24 0.33 
M4₁ 0.708 0.505 0.589 0.668 0.186 0.337 
M2₃₀ 0.729 0.587 0.65 0.695 0.203 0.393 
M3₃₀ 0.716 0.648 0.68 0.706 0.239 0.412 
M4₃₀ 0.745 0.61 0.67 0.711 0.195 0.424 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
M1 
M2₁ 
M3₁ 
M4₁ 
M2₃₀ 
M3₃₀ 
M4₃₀ 
Precision Recall 
F-
measure 
Accuracy FPR MCC 
M1 0.618 0.421 0.5 0.595 0.243 0.189 
M2₁ 0.672 0.546 0.603 0.66 0.238 0.317 
M3₁ 0.677 0.567 0.617 0.669 0.241 0.333 
M4₁ 0.68 0.566 0.617 0.67 0.238 0.335 
M2₃₀ 0.717 0.639 0.676 0.704 0.235 0.408 
M3₃₀ 0.725 0.646 0.683 0.711 0.228 0.422 
M4₃₀ 0.729 0.646 0.685 0.713 0.224 0.426 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
M1 
M2₁ 
M3₁ 
M4₁ 
M2₃₀ 
M3₃₀ 
M4₃₀ 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF IDENTITY DECEPTION DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR MULTIPLE 
ACCOUNTS OWNED BY THE SAME USER. 
 
Adaptive SVM 
Text Attribute 
Disagreement 
Algorithm [6] 
Natural 
Language 
Processing 
Similarity 
Searching [5] 
Non-Verbal 
Expectancy 
Violations 
Detection 
(Our Proposed 
Detection 
Method) 
Overall 
accuracy 
80.4% - 98.6% 68.8% 71.3% 
Indicators used Verbal Verbal Non-verbal 
(Verbal can be 
added however) 
Limitations Limited to 
cases where 
profile 
attributes are 
provided 
Limited to 
cases where 
text is 
communicated 
through 
Limited to 
cases where 
data on user 
activity is 
available 
Efficiency for 
analyzing a 
newly 
registered user 
O(w’N’) (N’ is 
smaller than the 
total number of 
users in 
database 
focusing on 
records close to 
the new 
account) 
O(N*R) (N 
number of users 
in database and 
R all revisions 
made by each 
user) 
O(1*R’), R’ is a 
limited amount 
of revisions 
(R’<R) made 
by the user in 
question in the 
window of 
observation 
Time of 
application 
As soon as data 
is added on a 
profile (missing 
values are 
allowed) 
As soon as a 
user posts a text 
somewhere 
(preferably 
enough cases 
for the 
algorithm to 
pick up on 
cues) 
After a set time 
window (e.g., 
12 hours) that 
distinguishes 
newcomer from 
old user 
 
 
the detection method is used to report suspect cases so that 
administrators can keep a close eye on or restrict certain 
features for suspect accounts for a time period, then recall is 
the most important feature and low precision can be tolerated. 
The machine learning algorithms  that we used in this study 
usually provide higher accuracy results than traditional models 
(e.g., binary logistic regression [35]) used in statistical 
research). However, they are “black-boxes” in the sense that 
they produce results but it is less evident how variables affect 
a prediction. The adaptive boosting package in R (ada) does 
offer a measure of the importance of variables that are 
included in a model [36]. The measure calculates how each 
variable improves the predictive accuracy. We present results 
for variable importance for      based on the adaptive 
boosting algorithm shown in Fig. 5. In conjunction with 
theresults shown in Fig. 3, the distribution of edits is a 
powerful predictor for deception just as we hypothesized that 
is likely to be. Deceivers have a higher probability of 
delivering content to multiple namespaces as opposed to 
newcomers who are less likely to do so. The total number of 
revisions made by a deceiver also demonstrate that deceivers 
tend to be more active and in namespaces other than the 
article’s namespace. Moreover, the average duration between 
revisions shows that deceivers take longer times between 
posting their revisions. A plausible explanation for this result 
is that deceivers need to take longer to make strategic 
decisions to ensure success for their deception.  
The results obtained show that the use of non-verbal user 
activity is a viable and efficient method for detecting identity 
deception (specifically sockpuppetry). Our method achieved 
an overall accuracy of 71.3% in identifying deceivers. The 
method also incurs a much lower computational overhead over 
previous methods while achieving an overall accuracy that 
renders it a valid choice for an early filtering system. 
Moreover, although we have used Wikipedia as an example of 
a social medium, this deception detection method can be 
applied to other social media domains. In fact, the detection 
method can be used with any social media service that 
contains user footprints that are not only verbal (e.g., text, 
audio, video) but also non-verbal (e.g., frequency of posting, 
time between updates, length or duration of messages). 
Moreover, the method also demonstrated the value of using 
non-verbal communication to detect identity deception in real 
time with limited resources (given that it is computationally 
efficient).  
One possible explanation as to why our proposed detection 
method is effective can be found from IDT and LT. A 
deceiver is constantly evaluating the receiver and is 
continuously adjusting his or her behavior accordingly. Such 
adjustments are likely to be applied to what a deceiver can 
perceive as something communicated to a receiver and other 
third parties present within the observable vicinity of a 
deceiver. Non-verbal activity for a deceiver is less likely to be 
perceived as monitored especially in a digital environment. In 
addition, even if such activity is controlled, certain cues will 
still leak and leave a footprint which others can make use of 
later on. For example, the impatience of sending messages to 
multiple namespaces right after an account registration is less 
likely to be controlled. Based on results obtained in this work, 
we argue that a deceiver is less likely to attribute importance 
to non-verbal activity on social media. The deceiver is less 
aware that there is a footprint for that online activity, and also 
less aware that others can detect this footprint and he or she is 
also likely to have less control over controlling such non-
verbal activity. 
Our results have also contributed to a new perspective on 
sockpuppetry where it is a challenging to detect identity 
deception. Our results show that in online communities where 
one account per user is enforced by a social media service’s 
policy, sockpuppets will deviate from the baseline behavior of 
newcomers. This deviation is in line with EVT and we have 
demonstrated that sockpuppets tend to be more active than 
newcomers possibly due to their prior knowledge and skills 
with various other systems. 
A. Limitations of our Proposed Detection Method 
The efficiency and effectiveness of our proposed detection 
method is influenced by several context specific factors. The 
time window set for observing early new user behavior has a 
significant impact on the method’s effectiveness. It can also 
affect the efficiency if the window is too large given that more 
data will be needed to be examined by the detection method. 
Another issue is the identification of measurable non-verbal 
behavior in social media. We have demonstrated a couple of 
examples in our paper. More work is needed in the future to 
implement such a method to identify the most optimum set of 
variables that can assist in detecting identity deception and are 
also computationally efficient. However, our method based on 
the expectancy violations theory is still superior in deception 
detection compared to methods of similarity searching and 
text comparative methods used by other previously proposed 
 
Fig. 5.  Variable importance plot for      based on the adaptive boosting 
algorithm. 
 
  
detection techniques [5], [6] . Finally, the social medium 
under examination will also determine the data that can be 
used. It is worth pointing out that although our method is 
portable to any social media classification, adaptations may be 
needed to ensure its proper implementation. Research is a 
necessary step to identify what non-verbal behaviors can be 
consistently and quantitatively be translated into variables that 
can be included in a predictive model. These behaviors will 
need to be good indicators (at least conceptually) of a 
substantial difference between how legitimate and deceitful 
users operate. After these variables are identified, one will 
need to develop models to find the most optimum model with 
the highest predictive accuracy. It requires a lot of work up 
front but the computational and practical efficiency of the 
method may prove beneficial to other social media services. 
B. Future work 
Future work will need to examine other non-verbal behavior 
variables in different social media services that can be used as 
good indicators of deception. Moreover, combining research 
on verbal detection deception with the non-verbal behavior 
deception detection method presented in this study may help 
improve prediction accuracy.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the explosive growth of social media applications 
and networks, deception in social media environment is an 
area that has not received commensurate attention from 
researchers, designers, and developers. Identity deception in 
particular is something that has haunted the Internet with a 
number of incidents receiving attention because of the ease of 
creating new accounts. Given the increasing number of 
Internet users and social media users, identity deception is 
likely to increase and the discussion on deception detection 
will become even more important. There are automated 
solutions that guarantee higher detection rates than human 
detection but the computational challenges of monitoring 
verbal communications are many. Non-verbal behavior 
monitoring for deception detection is an alternative path that 
can be used as a leading or complimentary detection solution. 
A coordinated effort is required to test these solutions on 
different platforms and advance the field of social media 
identity deception detection. 
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